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Introduction
Research in the fields of innovation and entrepreneurship has established that young firms tend to be better at radical innovation than incumbents (e.g., Arrow 1962 , Reinganum 1983 , Scherer and Ross 1990 , van Praag and Versloot 2007 and that established firms frequently source such innovations through acquisitions (e.g., Baumol 2010 , Bloningen and Taylor 2000 , Granstrand and Sjölander 1990 , Hall 1990 , Hsu 2006 , Lerner and Merges 1998 . A case in point is Pharmasset, Inc., acquired by biotech firm Gilead in 2011 for its novel therapeutic concept against Hepatitis C virus infections (Bloomberg, 2011) . The acquisition price of USD 11 billion suggests that the innovation central to the transaction was a radical one, significantly superior to Gilead's own solution. Yet, as already Schumpeter (1942) noted, important innovations may also come from incumbents due to their superior capital position; and in turn, not all innovations generated by startups are radical. Young firms may also be founded, and acquired, on the basis of relatively minor innovations. Consider the case of iLytix Systems AS, bought in 2005 by the software maker SAP for an undisclosed sum. The startup's key technology was its product XL Reporter, a tool that establishes an interface between SAP's software and Microsoft Excel (Computer Business Existing research offers a number of answers to these questions. Gans and Stern (2000) are the first to theoretically analyze R&D competition between a startup and an incumbent where acquisition of the former is an option. The authors find that the parties' incentives to invest depend strongly on their respective bargaining power in licensing negotiations, which, in turn, depends on the strength of intellectual property rights, the incumbent's threat to develop its own solution, and the young firm's possibilities of product market entry. Kleer and Wagner (2013) assume that small firms are more efficient in R&D, and large firms are better in exploitation. As a result, small firms invest more in R&D. With sufficiently large differences in efficiency, large firms refrain from performing R&D and rely exclusively on acquisitions. In a similar vein, Phillips and Zhdanov (2012) build a model where firms are heterogeneous with respect to production costs, and show that large firms with low costs may refrain from doing R&D and instead acquire smaller R&D active competitors. Henkel et al. (2015) model R&D competition between an incumbent and an arbitrary number of startups, assuming a startup needs to be acquired by the incumbent for its invention to be commercialized. Firms choose the success probability of their respective R&D project, rather than investment as in the models cited above. 2 The authors identify an equilibrium in which the incumbent chooses the safest project, and startups pursue pairwise different projects that become riskier the more firms participate in the competition.
While existing studies greatly enhance our understanding of R&D competition between entrants and incumbents when acquisition is an option, they restrict the firms' choice of R&D strategies to one dimension, either the investment level or the success probability. While legitimate for simplification, such a restriction excludes interactions and trade-offs between the two dimensions-relationships that are likely crucial. For instance, it appears plausible that in order to produce radical innovations startups would pursue riskier R&D approaches, while incumbents might instead dedicate more resources to a project. We 2 Also Färnstrand Damsgaard et al. (2017) model R&D competition between an incumbent and an entrant using success probability, or risk level, as the players' strategy variable. However, their model excludes the possibility of an acquisition. thus extend existing research by studying both risk level and investment as elements of the players' strategies.
To this end, we develop a game-theoretic model of R&D competition between one or two startups and one incumbent in which firms simultaneously choose success probability and investment level.
Nature decides which projects succeed, upon which the incumbent realizes the most valuable project. If this project is owned by a startup, the incumbent acquires this firm (or its technology). We study a number of extensions of the model to demonstrate its robustness.
Our results point to a dichotomous choice of R&D strategy by high-tech startups that face R&D competition with incumbents and aim to be acquired. Under certain conditions, two locally optimal strategy choices for the startup exist, which we characterize as "high risk" and "low cost," respectively.
Pursuing the former, the startup chooses a lower success probability than the incumbent, with concomitant higher value in case of success. In contrast, the low cost strategy implies a lower investment level. Depending on the R&D technology, either of the two strategies may be the startup's globally optimal strategy. With two startups, numerical analysis shows that either both go for a high risk strategy, both go for a low cost strategy, or each picks a different type of strategy. Our findings are robust to variations in the players' relative bargaining powers.
The intuition behind our results is that a startup pursuing a high risk strategy aims at technological superiority, while one that follows a low cost strategy banks on having the only successful R&D project.
These different situations affect the marginal benefits of higher risk and higher investment differentially, which gives rise to the dichotomy of locally optimal strategies. Our model thus suggests a structural dichotomy rather than a continuous diversity of technology-focused acquisitions of startups by incumbents. In addition, our analysis shows that the project with the highest value in case of success may originate either from the startup pursuing a riskier project, or from the incumbent investing more.
This paper contributes to three streams of literature. The first is the aforementioned literature on R&D competition between startups and incumbents when acquisition of the former is an option (Gans and Stern 2000 , Henkel et al. 2015 , Kleer and Wagner 2013 , Phillips and Zhdanov 2012 . Our research introduces a dichotomy of the startups' R&D strategies and hence of the acquisitions, thus adding clarity to the strong heterogeneity of technology-focused acquisitions.
Second, we contribute to research on markets for technology, which are growing fast and have become sizeable during the last decades (Arora et al. 2001 , Athreye and Cantwell 2007 , Robbins 2006 .
Sellers in these markets are both large companies looking for ways to improve revenues and small startups with limited possibilities to commercialize the technologies themselves. On the side of buyers, incumbent firms frequently acquire the technologies of small, innovative startups in order to stay ahead and to preempt competition (Bloningen and Taylor 2000 , Grimpe and Hussinger 2008 , 2009 , Hall 1990 , Lehto and Lehtoranta 2006 , Lerner and Merges 1998 . Our study provides a more fine-grained understanding of technology-focused acquisitions by incumbents, explaining why minor technologies may also be subject to such acquisitions.
Third, our work relates to the large literature on R&D competition. Previous work has shown that the R&D strategy of a firm has many dimensions: the amount of resources to invest in R&D (Arrow 1962 , Gilbert and Newbery 1982 , Reinganum 1983 , the composition of the R&D portfolio (Cabral 1994) , the R&D trajectory to follow (Cardon and Sasaki 1998) , the choice of risk and return (Anderson and Cabral 2007, Bhattacharya and Mookherjee 1986) , and the correlation between own and competitors' R&D outcomes (Dasgupta and Maskin 1987) . However, researchers typically address these dimensions in isolation, ignoring possible interactions between them. 3 In this paper, we contribute to the literature by considering a setup where firms choose the R&D investment and the risk of the project, the two most prominent R&D choices in the literature. We show that the choices are interdependent and that the entrant chooses either low investment and low risk or high investment and high risk.
3 Ali et al. (1993) consider the choice between a radical and an incremental project where the two types of projects involve different risk and investment. However, as the choice is discrete, the possibilities to study the interaction between risk and investment are limited.
In the next section, we introduce our model, which we analyze in Section 3. Section 4 addresses extensions of the model and robustness checks. The final section concludes. Most proofs appear in the Appendix.
Model Set-Up
The basic model has two risk-neutral players, the incumbent ( ) and the startup ( ). They play a threestage game. In Stage 1, each player ( , ) chooses the success probability, , of its innovation project, and the investment level or cost, . In Stage 2, Nature determines success or failure of the projects. With probability , the project of player takes on the value , ; with probability 1 , it takes on a value of zero. We call . , . the "value function"; it describes the value of an innovation project if it is successful and subsequently commercialized by the incumbent. 4 We will sometimes refer to the "value in case of success" as VICOS. In Stage 3, if the project with the highest realized value is that of the startup, the incumbent acquires the firm (or its innovation) at a price equal to the difference in realized value between the startup's and its own project. That is, regarding the negotiation, we assume that has all the bargaining power and makes a binding take-it-or-leave-it offer to . We will relax this assumption in an extension to the model. If the realized value of the startup's project is not greater than that of 's, then the incumbent makes no acquisition and realizes its own project (or none, if both have failed). We make the following assumptions regarding the value function:
2)
, is continuous and twice continuously differentiable.
3) , 0.
4)
0: a "safer" project yields lower value in case of success.
5)
0: higher investment leads to higher value in case of success.
6) The Hessian matrix of , is negative definite. This assumption implies concavity with respect to and .
7)
For given , the function , takes on its maximum at in the interior of the interval 0; 1 . 8) For given , the function , takes on its maximum at ̃ 0.
Expected profits of the incumbent and the startup, respectively, are then given by
, , , ,
From the assumptions, it follows that the function , , which is also the profit function of a monopolist not threatened by entry, takes on its global maximum at some point , ̃ with 0 1 and ̃ 0. It follows that the incumbent has a dominant strategy given by * , * , ̃ , and the value of its project in case of success equals , ̃ .
Solving the Model

First-Order Conditions and the Startup's Best Responses
Partial differentiation of equations (1) and (2) yields the first-order conditions:
From our assumptions it follows that there is a unique solution * , * to equations (3) and (4), as already explained. It also follows that there is at most one solution p , c to the equations in the respective upper lines of (5) and (6), although there is no guarantee of the existence of such a solution. An analogous argument holds for the respective lower lines of (5) and (6); if a solution , exists, then it is unique. Note, superscripts ">" and "<" refer to the startup's optimal choice given that it pursues a project of higher and lower value in case of success than the incumbent's project, respectively.
The firms' first-order conditions with respect to are identical for , , , while those with respect to are identical for , , . The intuition behind this observation is that, for , , , the incumbent's R&D activity reduces the startup's revenues compared with a monopolist's by the multiplicative factor of 1 ; the startup creates revenues only if the incumbent fails. This factor affects the startup's trade-off between revenues and costs, making, due to concavity of , with respect to , lower investments more attractive. At the same time, it leaves the trade-off between a safer and a more valuable project unchanged. Thus, if a solution to the first-order conditions in the lower lines of (5) and (6) exists, we refer to it as the startup's "low cost strategy." When choosing it, the startup banks on having the only successful project.
In contrast, if , , , then 's R&D reduces 's expected payoff compared with a monopolist's by the subtractive term of , , thus making smaller values of (entailing higher payoffs in case of success) more attractive to . At the same time, the two players' first-order conditions with respect to investment level, , are identical (see (4) and the upper line of (6)). If a solution to the first-order conditions in the upper lines of (5) and (6) exist, we call it the startup's "high risk strategy."
In this term, "risk" retains its colloquial meaning of "probability of failure." A more accurate term, though rather awkward, would be "low success probability strategy."
Choosing this strategy, the startup aims at having a better solution than the incumbent, and does so by pursuing riskier projects. This distinction lies at the heart of our results. 
, , ,
, ,
These relations have a clear interpretation. The incumbent's choosing a safer project diminishes the startup's profits from the low cost strategy (see (9)), while the effect on 's profits at , is ambiguous and vanishes for * (see (7)). The intuition is that banking on having the only successful project becomes less attractive the higher the success probability of the other player's project. Instead, if the startup aims for a superior project, it is the expected value of the incumbent's project that matters.
This value is maximized for * , and infinitesimal changes in around * do not affect the expected value of the incumbent's project. Turning to the effects of changes in , the incumbent's investing more makes the high risk strategy, , , less attractive for (see (8)), while its profits at , are unchanged (see (10)). Also this finding is intuitive: the more valuable the incumbent's project in case of success, the harder it becomes for the startup to realize profits by having a superior project. On the other hand, if the startup realizes profits only if the incumbent fails, then it is irrelevant how valuable the incumbent's project is in case of success. We summarize these findings in the following proposition. For the subsequent analysis we introduce the function ̅ , defined as follows:
Since , is, by definition, strictly increasing in c, the equation in the last line of the above expression can, for any given , be fulfilled by at most one value of . Inserting ̅ into the lower line in (11) and differentiating implicitly with respect to shows that the slope of ̅ is equal to the marginal rate of technical substitution:
The inequality follows from the assumptions we made regarding the value function. The function ̅ divides the , space into two areas. For convenience, we introduce the following notation:
We will also use and , defined as and but with strict inequalities.
Separable Value Functions
Before we derive additional general results, we first study the class of separable value functions, which enables further characterization of the candidate equilibria. Afterward, we look at a specific, separable value function for which the overall equilibrium of the game can be determined. Proposition 2 shows that the two local maxima remain separate, , and pursuing one or the other type of locally optimal project is a truly dichotomous choice.
We consider now the specific, separable value function, , 1 in order to obtain additional insight. For the incumbent and a startup playing a low investment strategy, the first-order condition with respect to p simplifies to:
The corresponding investment decisions are given by the first-order conditions:
If the startup instead follows the high risk strategy, the following two first-order conditions characterize the R&D choices: 
For given , , the marginal rate of technical substitution is increasing in . In other words, an increase in implies that investment becomes relatively more important for the creation of value in case of success. Therefore, the startup's investment if it pursues the high risk strategy and aims at a superior project, increases relative to the one made if it plays the low investment strategy. In other words, / is increasing in . At the same time, an increase in triggers a decrease in in order to reduce the investment requirement of the high risk strategy; that is, / is decreasing in . These effects imply that the high risk strategy becomes more costly for the startup compared with the low investment strategy as increases. Numerically solving the model and calculating the startup's profits for both local maxima show that two strategies yield identical payoffs for 0.3128. For values of above this threshold, the low cost strategy , is globally optimal for the startup, while for smaller values the high risk solution , yields the higher payoff. The startup's payoff at the high risk strategy becomes negative at 0.5656 and at 0.7145 a local maximum in ceases to exist.
Existence of Two Local Maxima of the Startup's Profit Function
In this subsection, we provide two general results regarding the startup's profit function and its two types of strategies. While we cannot spell out or interpret in full generality the conditions under which two local maxima of the startup's profit function exist, 6 we prove two related results. The first of these refers to the slope of the startup's profit function at the incumbent's equilibrium strategy point. Also, Proposition 4 constitutes, in a sense, a local version of the duality between high risk and low cost equilibria. It furthermore describes a situation that will be realistic in many cases-namely, that the startup has only probabilistic assumptions about the incumbent's performing or not performing competing R&D. In circumstances where the startup attaches a low probability to the incumbent working on a competing R&D project, the high risk and the low cost strategy are both locally optimal for the startup.
Extensions
We now turn to extensions of our model. We introduce bargaining power on the side of the incumbent, and we consider the case of two startups that are competing for acquisition. These extensions serve to demonstrate that our key finding of a dichotomous choice of R&D strategy by startups is robust.
Bargaining Power
In the basic model, we made the simplifying assumption that all bargaining power rests with the startup.
We relax this assumption now, analyzing the general case that the parties split the surplus that the startup's project creates over the value of the incumbent's. Specifically, we assume that the incumbent receives the share , 0 1, of this surplus. To keep the analysis simple, we employ the specific value function used before, , 1 √ . The players' profit functions are as follows.
, , , 1 1 1
Consider first the candidate equilibrium where the incumbent pursues the project of highest value. For the first-order conditions derived from (20), it is easy to show that the incumbent no longer has a dominant strategy: its optimal strategy depends on the strategy of the startup. Solving for the candidate equilibrium, we find:
, 1 1
Inserting these solutions into , shows that they fulfill the condition , , .
Looking first at the startup's choices, the startup chooses independently of . The startup's investment level exhibits a strong, negative dependence on , decreasing from at 0 to zero at 1. This is intuitive: through the incumbent's bargaining power the startup's revenues decrease by a factor of 1 .
Turning to the incumbent, notice that project failure is less costly compared with the base model, because the incumbent captures a fraction of the value created by the startup's project. The higher the value that the incumbent expects to capture from the startup, the more risk is the incumbent willing to take in its own project. Numerical calculations show the incumbent chooses a project with slightly lower success probability than the startup: with varying from zero to unity, decreases from 0.5 to 1 √14/4 /4 0.4839 (at 0.5), and then increases again to 0.5. An increase in allows the incumbent to capture more value but discourages investment, and thus value creation, by the startup. As a result of these two opposing effects, the incumbent has the highest expected profit in case of project failure, and chooses the highest risk, for 0.5. The incumbent's investment also shows a u-shaped dependence on as the return on R&D investment decreases the further is away from 0.5. It can be verified that these strategies constitute an equilibrium since neither the incumbent nor the startup has an incentive to deviate.
Interestingly, as one can show, , , , reaches its maximum at 0.5 where the optimal balance between value capture by the incumbent and value creation by the startup is achieved from the point of view of the incumbent. Not surprisingly, the profit of the startup is decreasing in .
Consider now the candidate equilibrium where the startup has the highest value in case of success.
Here, the incumbent wishes to acquire a successful startup, and the acquisition price is decreasing both in the value of the incumbent's own project and in the incumbent's bargaining power, . In that sense, project value and bargaining power are substitutes from the point of view of the incumbent. Except for 0.5, no closed-form solutions to the first-order conditions derived from (21) exist. One can show that a candidate equilibrium satisfying , , exists for 0.2173. However, this is not an equilibrium of the game, because it results in negative profits for the startup.
The result that only the low investment equilibrium exists is not due to the generalized assumptions regarding bargaining power, but to setting the exponent of in the definition of , equal to 0.5. For sufficiently low values of the exponent (see Section 3.2) and sufficiently small , the startup's high risk strategy will exist and be globally optimal for reasons of continuity.
Thus, our finding of two local equilibria, corresponding respectively to a high risk and a low cost strategy of the startup, is robust to changes in the distribution of bargaining power, as long as the startup receives a sufficiently large share of the pie. We summarize:
RESULT 
Two Startups
We now study the case of one incumbent and two startups competing for acquisition. We focus on the above family of value functions, , 1 . In the acquisition stage, the entrants simultaneously make price offers to the incumbent. If the incumbent has the most valuable project, no acquisition occurs. If this is not the case, it follows from standard Bertrand competition arguments that the incumbent acquires the most valuable project in equilibrium, paying the difference in value between the most valuable and the second most valuable project.
We will use the following notation: the two startups are denoted 1 and 2 where start-up i chooses and . Incumbent I chooses and . The profit of startup i can be written as:
where p and c are vectors of investments and success probabilities. Without loss of insight, it will be assumed in the following that in equilibrium. Then, the profit of the incumbent is given by:
In contrast to the baseline model with only one startup, the incumbent's choice ( , depends on the startups' choices. Consider the case of . The first-order conditions of the incumbent are:
The first-order condition with respect to is identical to that obtained in the case of only one startup.
Nonetheless, the solutions will, in general, not be the same since the first-order conditions with respect to differ (and appears in (26)). A general statement cannot be made if the solution * to (26) and (27) is equal to , larger, or smaller. In contrast, the first-order condition with respect to (27) Consider now the case of . Then, the first-order conditions of the incumbent are:
Here, the first-order condition for (29) 
Using equation (15), the decisions of startup i are characterized by the first-order conditions:
Comparing the two pairs of first-order conditions, it follows immediately that the incumbent invests more and takes less risk than a startup. The intuition is that the incumbent benefits from its innovation not only if it is the best, but also if it is the second-best. In the latter case, the incumbent's innovation is not implemented in equilibrium, but serves as a bargaining chip that reduces the price of acquiring the best innovation. In contrast, a startup only benefits from its innovation if it is the best in the market. Put differently, the incumbent has a stronger incentive to invest in R&D and to "play it safe" than a startup.
The same type of analysis is possible for the two remaining cases where the firm in question has the highest or the lowest VICOS. In both cases, the incumbent has a (weakly) stronger incentive to invest in R&D than a startup and a (weakly) stronger incentive to choose a high success probability.
The equilibrium of the game is characterized by a system of six non-linear first-order conditions.
Furthermore, the solutions to the first-order conditions correspond to locally optimal choices for the firms. To find the Nash equilibrium, it needs to be verified that a candidate solution also represents globally optimal choices for the firms. plays the high risk strategy whereas the other plays the low cost strategy. Overall, the extension to two firms confirms the result that startups have the choice between two types of strategies, a low cost or a high risk strategy.
Discussion
Technology acquisitions are highly diverse with respect to their value and the radicalness of their technology. Acquisition targets may provide radically new and superior technologies, as described by Henkel et al. (2015) for the EDA and the biotechnology industry. But they may also constitute low cost alternatives to an internal development by the incumbent, as for example is arguably the case if an incumbent internationalizes by acquiring a copycat startup in another country.
We have developed and analyzed a model of R&D competition between an incumbent and one or two startups that provides an economic explanation of this diversity. We find that the marginal incentives for the startup differ structurally between two situations. If the startup aims at being better than the incumbent, it has an incentive to pursue riskier projects than the potential acquirer. In contrast, if it banks on having the only successful project then it is optimal for the startup to invest less than the incumbent.
Globally, either the high risk or the low cost strategy may be optimal for the startup. This finding is robust toward variations in the parties' relative bargaining power, and to the introduction of a second startup. As a supplementary result, we find that having too much bargaining power may be harmful to the incumbent.
Anticipating that it will receive only a small share of the surplus, the startup has limited incentives to invest in the first place, which, in turn, negatively affects the incumbent's profits in case of an acquisition.
Our results contribute to a better understanding of the interplay of incumbents and startups in technological innovation. In particular, the established wisdom that startups tend to be better at radical innovation requires qualification. While under certain conditions startups do have an incentive to pursue R&D approaches with a higher value in case of success, there are also circumstances under which they will go after less valuable projects. The economic logic behind both types of equilibria differs from explanations provided by earlier authors. Arrow (1962) argues that an entrant has a greater incentive than an incumbent to invest in radical innovation, since the latter would cannibalize its existing product. While this situation resembles our high risk equilibrium insofar as the entrant creates the more valuable innovation, it is not higher investments that drive the outcome in our model, but rather a riskier R&D approach. This approach, we note, will often be more realistic, given that startups tend to be financially constrained. Gilbert and Newbery (1982) argue for the case of incremental innovation that an incumbent's incentive to remain a monopolist, and thus to invest in its innovation, is greater than an entrant's incentive to become one of two duopolists. Again, there is a superficial similarity to low cost equilibria in our model, but the explanations differ; our result is based not on the anticipation of market duopoly, given that the incumbent has a product with certainty, but on the likelihood of the incumbent failing.
Our study has a number of limitations. First, we exclude product market entry by the startup, such that our model is applicable only to industries such as ICT and biotechnology, in which being acquired is the predominant path for startups. Second, we model a bilateral monopoly and a situation where two startups compete for acquisition, but we leave out the reverse case of two or more incumbents competing to acquire a smaller number of startups. Third, we assume as the only difference between a startup and an incumbent the former's lack of complementary assets. Including cannibalization on the side of the incumbent would make the model richer, but also difficult to handle and less focused. Finally, we provide a model but no empirical evidence of a dichotomy between high risk and low cost startup strategies. Thus, future work should seek empirical support for our model predictions, and should analyze how industry characteristics translate into model parameters that favor one or the other type of equilibrium. 
